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HARDT V. RELIANCE
STANDARD LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY: ATTORNEY'S FEE
AWARDS UNDER ERISA AND THE
"SOME DEGREE OF SUCCESS"
STANDARD
MATTHEW D. GIMOVSKY*
INTRODUCTION
In Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co.,' the United States
Supreme Court considered whether Section 1132(g)(1) of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") 2 limits the availability
of attorney's fees to prevailing parties.3 Reviewing the plain text of the
statute, the Court held that a moving party need only show "some degree of
success on the merits" to be eligible for a fee award and that Section
1132(g)(1) does not make prevailing party status a prerequisite for such an
award.4 In so holding, the Court correctly followed its precedent concerning
statutory deviations from the American Rule of attorney's fees5 while
concurrently resolving a disagreement between the United States Courts of
Appeals. 6 The Court failed, however, to address the question of whether a
remand order qualifies as "some degree of success on the merits" under its
new standard and thereby fettered the important victory that it had just
crafted for ERISA plaintiffs.7 If the Court had found that a remand order
constitutes "some degree of success on the merits," it could have clarified
Copyright 0 Matthew D. Gimovsky 2011.
* Matthew D. Gimovsky is a third-year student at the University of Maryland School of Law
where he serves as the Technology Editor for the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy. The
author is grateful for the assistance of the Editorial Board and wishes to thank Professor Diane
Hoffmann for her insightful commentary.
I. 130 S. Ct. 2149 (2010).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006).
3. Hardt, 130 S. Ct. at 2152.
4. Id at 2156-58.
5. See infra Part IV.A.
6. See infra Part IV.A.
7. See infra Part IV.B.l.
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how the lower courts should treat remand orders, which are an important
judicially-created ERISA remedy, without the delay necessary for a
representative case to be fully litigated.8
I. THE CASE
Dan River, Inc., a textile manufacturing company, provides Group
Long-Term Disability Insurance ("the Plan") to its employees. 9 Although
Dan River offers the insurance to its employees, Reliance Standard Life
Insurance Company ("Reliance") determines whether employees are
entitled to benefits under the Plan and pays any claims made by employees
against the Plan.10 In 2000, Bridget Hardt, an employee at Dan River, began
experiencing pain "in her neck and shoulders" and, after consultation with
her physicians, was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome." Surgery was
unable to remedy her complaints, and, on January 23, 2003, Ms. Hardt
stopped working.12 Several months later, Ms. Hardt petitioned Reliance for
the payment of long-term disability benefits under the Plan. 13
In response to the claim, Reliance provisionally approved an award of
benefits to Ms. Hardt pending the outcome of a functional capacities
evaluation ("FCE").14 Although the FCE demonstrated that Ms. Hardt
"suffered from major limitations in moving her neck, upper extremity pain,
decreased right hand dexterity and strength, restricted overhead reach, a
restricted ability to squat and kneel ... [and] decreased lift, carrying, and
push and pull capabilities,"' 5 Reliance denied an award of benefits based on
its finding that Ms. Hardt was able to perform minor amounts of sedentary
work. 16 Ms. Hardt appealed the denial of benefits, and Reliance responded
8. See infra Part IV.B.2.
9. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 540 F. Supp. 2d 656, 657 (E.D. Va. 2008),
rev'd, 336 F. App'x 332 (4th Cir. 2009), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 2149 (2010).
10. Id.
11. Id See generally Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 199 (2002)
("[C]ases of severe carpel tunnel syndrome are characterized by muscle atrophy and extreme
sensory deficits [and] mild cases generally. . . create only intermittent symptoms of numbness and
tingling.").
12. Hardt, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 657.
13. Id. In her request, Ms. Hardt explained that she "suffered from numbness, tingling, loss of
feeling, and extreme pain in her arms, hands, shoulders, and neck." Id.
14. Id
15. Id.
16. Id. Hand Rehabilitation of Hampton Roads administered the FCE on behalf of Reliance
and provided an evaluation of the results. Id. The evaluator found that Ms. Hardt "could perform a
sedentary level of work and lift 4 to 5 pounds on occasion with her right hand, and 2 to 3 pounds
on a frequent basis." Id. Reliance grounded its denial of benefits on those findings, but reversed
itself "based on Ms. Hardt's inability to perform her current position." Id. at 658.
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by offering her benefits for a twenty-four month period.' 7 In the months
following the temporary award, Ms. Hardt's health worsened, resulting in a
diagnosis of small-fiber neuropathy-a condition evidenced by loss of
temperate sensation and burning pain.18 While Ms. Hardt underwent
treatment for neuropathy, she applied for disability benefits from the Social
Security Administration.19 To support her claim, Ms. Hardt submitted
questionnaires from her treating physicians that concluded that her physical
condition would neither allow her to return to her former position with Dan
River, nor would it enable her to attain any other sedentary employment. 20
The Social Security Administration concluded that Ms. Hardt was
"disabled" under the terms of the Social Security Act for the same reasons
provided by her treating physicians.21
Shortly after Ms. Hardt began receiving Social Security benefits,
Reliance informed her that it would discontinue its contributions after the
initial twenty-four month period because, under the terms of the Plan,
further benefits could not accrue unless she was totally disabled from all
occupations.22 Reliance determined that Ms. Hardt was not totally disabled,
in part due to negative magnetic resonance image ("MRI") 23 and
electromyogram examinations, 24 and in part due to the report of a Reliance-
hired physician who concluded that Ms. Hardt's prognosis was either
"excellent or fair to good." 25 In the report he provided to Reliance, Dr.
Leibowitz failed to consider the questionnaires used by Hardt in her
application to Social Security, as well as other pertinent evidence produced
by Hardt's treating physicians. 26 After following the appellate procedures
prescribed by the Plan, Ms. Hardt filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging that Reliance's wrongful
denial of long-term disability benefits constituted a violation of ERISA.27
17. Id. at 657-58.
18. Id. at 658 & n.1.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 659. The Social Security Administration determined that "it was impossible for her
to return to her former employment or make an adjustment to perform other work." Id.
22. Id
23. Id. See generally Jennifer Kulynych, Note, Psychiatric Neuroimaging Evidence: A High-
Tech Crystal Ball?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1255 (1997) ("In MRI, grayscale images are
constructed from the electromagnetic signals that are emitted by the proton nuclei of hydrogen
atoms, which are found predominantly in tissue water.").
24. Hardt, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 659. See generally Andrew B. Lustigman, Comment, A New
Look at Thermography 's Place in the Courtroom: A Reconciliation of the Conflicting Evidentiary
Rules, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 419, 428 (1990) ("Electromyography provides a continuous recording of
the electrical activity of a muscle measured by electrodes inserted into the muscle fibers.").
25. Hardt, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 659.
26. Id. at 659-60.
27. Id at 660.
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Because Reliance failed to consider all of the available evidence
before it concluded that Ms. Hardt was not completely disabled within the
terms of the Plan, the district court found that Reliance violated ERISA. 28
The district court remanded the case to Reliance with instructions that it
undertake a comprehensive review of the record,29 cautioning that failure to
do so within thirty days would result in the granting of a favorable
judgment to Ms. Hardt. 30 Reliance followed the district court's mandate,
and shortly thereafter, Ms. Hardt filed a motion in the district court for
attorney's fees "based upon her status as the prevailing party." 31 The
district court granted the motion because its remand order had "sanctioned a
material change in the legal relationship of the parties by ordering
[Reliance] to conduct the type of review to which [Hardt] was entitled." 32
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
Reliance challenged the award of attorney's fees to Ms. Hardt.33 In vacating
the award, the Fourth Circuit held that Hardt had not won an enforceable
judgment on the merits and was therefore not eligible to receive attorney's
fees under Section 1132(g)(1). 34 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider whether a fee claimant must be a prevailing party in
order to recover attorney's fees under Section 1132(g)(1). 35
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The so-called American Rule,36 as developed by the United States
Supreme Court in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,37
provides that a "prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a
reasonable attorneys' fee from the loser." 38 Under the American Rule,
28. Id. at 659, 661-63. After itemizing all of the evidence Reliance failed to consider, the
district court found that the bases for Dr. Leibowitz's "medical conclusions [were] extremely
vague and conclusory." Id. at 661. It also found that Reliance "ignored the substantial amount of
pain medication Ms. Hardt's treating physicians had prescribed to her" and "failed to consider
medical records submitted by Ms. Hardt that demonstrated she was suffering from neuropathy."
Id. at 663.
29. Id at 664.
30. Id
31. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 336 F. App'x 332, 334 (4th Cir. 2009), rev'd,
130 S. Ct. 2149 (2010).
32. Id. Because Ms. Hardt "received precisely the benefits she had sought" the court found
that she qualified as a "prevailing party" within the meaning of the statute. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 336.
35. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 2149, 2155-56 (2010).
36. The American Rule is "[t]he general policy that all litigants, even the prevailing one, must
bear their own attorney's fees." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 98 (9th ed. 2009).
37. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
38. Id at 247.
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unless the narrow bad faith exception 39 or the common fund doctrine40
applies, federal courts may award attorney's fees only in those instances
specially identified by statute.41 Section 1132(g)(1) of ERISA specifically
provides federal courts with the authority to award attorney's fees; it states
that "[i]n any action under this subchapter ... by a participant, beneficiary,
or fiduciary, the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney's fee
and costs of action to either party." 42
A. The American Rule for the Payment ofAttorney's Fees
The Supreme Court first announced what has become known as the
American Rule in the 1796 case Arcambel v. Wiseman.43 In that case, the
victorious plaintiff argued that attorney's fees should be recoverable as
damages." The Court disagreed and overturned the award of attorney's
fees, noting that "[t]he general practice of the United States is in opposition
to it; and even if that practice were not strictly correct in principle, it is
entitled to the respect of the court, till it is changed, or modified, by
statute." 45
Today, the "basic point of reference" 46 and "general rule"47 employed
by courts considering attorney's fee awards is the American Rule,48 which
39. See, e.g., Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1991) (recognizing that it is
within a court's discretion to determine "[t]he degree of punishment for contempt" and allowing
the court to levy as part of the punishment attorney's fees amounting to the entire cost of the
litigation) (quoting Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 428 (1923)); Vaughn
v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962) (awarding attorney's fees where the "callous ...
attitude" of the respondents caused the libellant "to hire a lawyer and go to court to get what was
plainly owed him under laws that are centuries old").
40. See, e.g., Cent. R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 125-27 (1885) (finding that
the award of attorney's fees is appropriate where the litigation establishes a common fund for
restitution and the award was granted to members of a class, and not to petitioners individually);
Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 537 (1881) (upholding attorney's fees where the purpose of
litigation was "reclaiming and rescuing [a] trust fund").
41. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 748 (1986) (noting that "only Congress [can]
authorize awarding fees").
42. 29 U.S.C. § 1 132(g)(1) (2006).
43. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796); see also Fleischmann Distilling Corp., v. Maier Brewing Co.,
386 U.S. 714, 717-18 (1967) (noting that the Court first announced the American Rule in
Arcambel and explaining its rationale).
44. Arcambel, 3 U.S. at 306; see also Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851)
(recognizing "that damages, assessed by way of example, may ... indirectly compensate the
plaintiff for money expended in counsel-fees; but the amount of these fees cannot be taken as the
measure of punishment or a necessary element in its infliction").
45. Arcambel, 3 U.S. at 306.
46. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 683 (1983).
47. Perdue v. Kenny A., 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1671 (2010).
48. Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 683.
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posits that "each party must pay its own attorney's fees and expenses," 49
except where Congress has explicitly provided otherwise via statute.50
Because the outcome of litigation cannot be predetermined, the American
Rule prevents litigants from being penalized for pursuing colorable, though
ultimately losing claims, and mitigates the impact that a lack of individual
financial means might otherwise have on the role of adjudication. 5 1
1. The American Rule Permits Statutory Deviations and Narrowly
Construed Exceptions
Although the federal judiciary has recognized exceptions to the
American Rule and awarded attorney's fees to a prevailing party where an
"opponent has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive
reasons,"52 statutes and private agreements provide the two primary
avenues by which courts award attorney's fees. 53
49. Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1671.
50. F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 126 (1974) ("The
so-called 'American Rule' governing the award of attorneys' fees in litigation in the federal courts
is that attorneys' fees 'are not ordinarily recoverable in the absence of a statute or enforceable
contract providing therefor."') (quoting Fleishmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386
U.S. 714, 717 (1967)); Flanders v. Tweed, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 450, 452-53 (1872) ("Attorneys,
solicitors, and proctors may charge their clients reasonably for their services, in addition to the
taxable costs, but nothing can be taxed or recovered as cost against the opposite party .... ). For
an in-depth discussion of the common law antecedents to the American Rule, see generally Arthur
L. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929).
51. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967); see also
Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil. Co., 379 U.S. 227, 237 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("It has not
been [an] accident that the American litigant must bear his own cost of counsel and other trial
expense save for minimal court costs, but a deliberate choice to ensure that access to the courts be
not effectively denied those of moderate means.") (internal citations omitted). The American Rule
is further supported by the fear that the time and expense inherent in determining a fair attorney's
fee is a drain on judicial resources. See Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211, 231 (1872)
(noting that it might be necessary to engage other court personnel in determining what a
reasonable attorney's fee is and that this "litigation might possibly be more animated and
protracted than that in the original cause").
52. F.D. Rich Co., 417 U.S. at 129; see also McEnteggart v. Cataldo, 451 F.2d 1109, 1112
(1st Cir. 1971) (upholding an award of attorney's fees where the "plaintiff was forced to go to
court [by the defendant] to obtain the statement of reasons to which he was constitutionally
entitled"); Bell v. Sch. Bd. of Powhatan Cnty., Va., 321 F.2d 494, 500 (4th Cir. 1963) (finding that
an award of attorney's fees was appropriate given the defendants "long continued pattern of
evasion and obstruction"). The American Rule also contains an exception for the creation of
common funds, where litigation "creates or traces a 'common fund,' the economic benefit of
which is shared by all members of the class." Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 n.7 (1973).
53. Trytek v. Gale Indus., Inc., 3 So.3d 1194, 1198 (Fla. 2009). Maryland follows the
American Rule such that a prevailing party is not able to recover fees "unless (1) the parties to a
contract have an agreement to that effect, (2) there is a statute that allows the imposition of such
fees, (3) the wrongful conduct of a defendant forces a plaintiff into litigation with a third party, or
(4) a plaintiff is forced to defend against a malicious prosecution." Nova Research, Inc., v. Penske
Truck Leasing Co., 952 A.2d 275, 281 (Md. 2008) (citations omitted).
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Federal courts are not empowered to award attorney's fees as part of
the costs of litigation except where expressly provided the right to do so by
statute.54 The United States Supreme Court solidified this rule in Alyeska
Pipeline Service Co., v. Wilderness Society.55 In Alyeska, the Wilderness
Society, as plaintiff, sought to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior from
issuing the necessary permits that would allow the Alyeska Pipeline Service
Company to construct a trans-Alaskan oil pipeline on the grounds that the
proposed pipeline failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 and Section 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920.56
Although the Wilderness Society lost on the merits, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that the Society could
recover attorney's fees. 57 The Supreme Court reversed, making three
critical findings.58 First, the Court reaffirmed the American Rule, stating
that "[i]n the United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled
to collect a reasonable attorneys' fee from the loser." 59 Second, the Court
recognized that Congress had not "extended any roving authority to the
Judiciary to allow counsel fees as costs or otherwise whenever the courts
might deem them warranted." 60 Third, the Court noted that "Congress has
made specific provision for attorneys' fees under certain federal
statutes[.]" 61 By denying fee-shifting to a losing party, the Alyeska Court,
through its findings, demonstrated the effect a loss on the merits of a case
has on the propriety of attorney's fee awards. In addition, the Alyeska Court
narrowed the scope of judicial analysis given to fee awards. The Court
instructed that the lower courts must consider the authority given by
Congress to the judiciary to make awards, review the express language of
54. See, e.g., Key Tronic Corp., v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 814 (1994) ("Our cases
establish that attorney's fees generally are not a recoverable cost of litigation 'absent explicit
congressional authorization."') (quoting Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 185 (1976));
Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 561-62 (1986)
("[T]here are exceptions to [the American Rule], the major one being congressional authorization
for the courts to require one party to award attorney's fees to the other."); In re Joslyn, 224 F.2d
223, 225 (7th Cir. 1955) (finding that attorney's fees may be awarded "only as specifically
provided by the [Bankruptcy] Act").
55. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
56. Id. at 242-43.
57. Id. at 245. The D.C. Circuit found that Alyeska could be liable for the award of attorney's
fees because plaintiffs litigation "had ensured that the governmental system functioned properly;
and were entitled to attorneys' fees lest the great cost of litigation of this kind, particularly against
well-financed defendants such as Alyeska." Id. at 245-46.
58. Id at 241.
59. Id at 247.
60. Id. at 260.
61. Id. at 254-55.
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the statute in question, and require something more than a loss on the merits
before granting a motion for attorney's fees.62
2. Ruckelshaus, Some Degree of Success on the Merits, and the Role of
the American Rule
Statutes providing the courts with authority to award attorney's fees
take many different forms. Certain statutes allow for fee awards to the
"prevailing party" 63 while others sanction attorney's fees when a party
"substantially" prevails. 64 The term "prevailing party" is not a modern term
of art introduced by the legislature to govern contemporary fee-shifting
provisions. 65 Rather, it has been part of the United States Code since the
enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1876.66 The term commonly refers to
"a judicial finding of liability." 67 When defining "prevailing party" under
42 U.S.C. § 1988, the commonly used attorney's fee provision for civil
right claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the United States Supreme
Court has found that "any significant issue in litigation which achieve[s]
some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit" 68 merits a fee
award.69 While the majority of fee-shifting statutes contain prevailing party
62. Attorney's fees were not specifically allowed under either the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 or the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. See id at 245 (noting that the Court of
Appeals considered other exceptions to the American Rule because there was no statutory
authorization for an award of attorney's fees).
63. See, e.g., Fair Housing Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C § 3613(c)(2) (2006) ("[T]he court, in
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee and costs.");
Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2006) ("[T]he court ... in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee . .. and costs."). Prevailing party
generally means "[a] party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of
damages awarded." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1232 (9th ed. 2009).
64. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(E)(i) (2006 & Supp 2007)
(authorizing attorney's fees where the "complainant has substantially prevailed"). The Code
defines the "substantially prevailed" standard as follows: "[flor purposes of this subparagraph, a
complainant has substantially prevailed if the complainant has obtained relief through either-(1)
a judicial order, or an enforceable written agreement or consent decree; or (II) a voluntary or
unilateral change in position . . . ." Id. §§ 552(E)(ii)(l)-(II).
65. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S.
598, 610 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring). In the words of Justice Scalia, the term [prevailing party]
"is not some newfangled legal term invented for use in late-20th-century fee-shifting statutes." Id
66. Id. at 611.
67. Id. at 614.
68. Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 791-92 (1989)
(quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1978)); see also Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S.
755, 760 (1987) ("Respect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least some
relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail.").
69. Tex. State Teachers Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 791-92.
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language,70 where statutes do not expressly refer to a prevailing party,
courts rely on a separate doctrine. 71
In Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club72 the Supreme Court provided guidance
on how to decide cases arising under statutes that deviate from the
American Rule, but that do not explicitly make fee awards available only to
prevailing parties. 73 The unsuccessful plaintiffs in Ruckelshaus (the Sierra
Club) moved for attorney's fees under Section 307(f) of the Clean Air
Act,74 which permits the award "whenever [the court] determines that such
an award is appropriate." 75 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider whether it was appropriate "within the meaning of
Section 307(f) of the Clean Air Act, to award attorney's fees to a party that
achieved no success on the merits of its claims." 76
At the time the case was decided, a majority of the 150 federal statutes
providing for the recovery of attorney's fees required some degree of
success on the merits before a claimant could succeed in fee-shifting. 77
While statutes varied in their use of "prevailing party" or "substantially"
prevailing party language, the rule mandated that a party must achieve some
litigation success in order for fee shifting to be appropriate. 78 Based on the
evidence before it, the Ruckelshaus Court found that it was inappropriate to
award attorney's fees to a losing plaintiff.79 Instead, the Court held that "the
term 'appropriate' modifies but does not completely reject the traditional
rule that a fee claimant must 'prevail' before it may recover attorney's
fees."80 Under Ruckelshaus, where the Court found that it is not clear that
"Congress meant to abandon historic fee-shifting principles and intuitive
notions of fairness" in a fee-shifting statute,81 plaintiffs seeking attorney's
70. See, e.g., Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 77 (2007) (reviewing a petition for attorney's fees
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988); Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 109 (1992) (ruling on attorney's fees
under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act); see also Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 43-51
(1985) (Brennan J., dissenting) (listing statutes that contain fee-shifting provisions in an appendix
to Justice Brennan's opinion); Coulter v. Tennessee, 805 F.2d 146, 152-55 (6th Cir. 1986) (listing
federal statutes that authorize the award of attorney fees).
71. See infra text accompanying notes 73-84.
72. 463 U.S. 680 (1983).
73. Id. at 682-83.
74. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006).
75. Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 681-82. In its decision, the Court noted that sixteen federal
statutes use identical language in allowing the recovery of attorney's fees, id. at 682 n.1, and over
150 federal statutes provide for an award of attorney's fees where some degree of success on the
merits was achieved. Id. at 684.
76. Id. at 682.
77. Id. at 684.
78. Id
79. Id. at 686.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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fees must win something greater than "trivial success on the merits, or [a]
purely procedural victor[y.]" 82 Where a statute authorizes attorney's fees,
but does not expressly limit their authorization to "prevailing parties," a
party must show "some degree of success on the merits" to prevail on a
motion for a fee award.8 3 ERISA is a prime example of a statute that falls
under the rubric created by the Court in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, and the
application of its principles ultimately played a vital role in Ms. Hardt's
successful attempt to enforce her legal rights.
B. ERISA Was Designed to Protect Pension Plan Beneficiaries and
Courts Have Looked to Congressional Intent to Evaluate the Statute's
Protection Scheme and the Role Attorney's Fees Play Under the Statute
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 was created to
protect "the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their
beneficiaries ... by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and
obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for
appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts." 84
By enacting ERISA, Congress created a far-reaching piece of legislation
that includes broad enforcement procedures aimed towards safeguarding the
value that employees accrue in their retirement plans. 85
Rapid growth in the value of pension plans and minimal existing
regulation spurred Congress into enacting ERISA. 86 In its Report on the
bill, the House Committee on Education and Labor, concluded that:
[T]he legislative approach of establishing minimum standards and
safeguards for private pensions is not only consistent with retention of the
freedom of decision-making vital to pension plans, but in furtherance of the
growth and development of the private pension system. At the same time,
the Committee recognizes the absolute need that safeguards for plan
participants be sufficiently adequate and effective to prevent the numerous
inequities to workers under plans which have resulted in tragic hardship in
so many.87
ERISA lays out a framework of "standards and safeguards" designed
to mediate and "prevent the numerous inequities" that Congress found
prevalent in existing private pension plans, including the inadequate vesting
82. Id at 688 n.9.
83. Id. at 694.
84. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2006).
85. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004) (quoting Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985)); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 113
(1989) (quoting Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc. 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983)).
86. H. REP. No. 93-533, at 3-4 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4641.
87. Id
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of pension funds, the loss of benefits due to plan termination, and the
misuse of pension funds.88 ERISA also creates an overlapping enforcement
system, which includes a private right of action for plan beneficiaries, 89 the
creation of fiduciary obligations for plan administrators,90  and the
availability of criminal sanctions. 91
At its heart, ERISA recognizes that it is vital to protect the ever-
increasing population of employees and retirees by safeguarding their
pension plans. 92 In the words of the Second Circuit, "private actions by
beneficiaries seeking in good faith to secure their rights under employee
benefits plans are important mechanisms for furthering ERISA's remedial
purpose." 93 In Meredith v. Navistar International Transportation Corp.,94
the Seventh Circuit reiterated that ERISA's central goal is "to protect
beneficiaries of pension plans."95 The Meredith court added that
"[a]dherence to this [remedial] policy often counsels against charging fees
against ERISA beneficiaries since private actions by beneficiaries seeking
in good faith to secure their rights under employee benefit plans are
important mechanisms for furthering ERISA's remedial purpose." 96
1. The Power to Award Attorney's Fees and Private Enforcement
Under ERISA
A critical part of ERISA's comprehensive remedial scheme is its
private right of action, which allows a plan participant or beneficiary to
88. Id; S. REP. No. 93-383, at 3-4 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N 4890, 4892-93.
The House Committee on Education and Labor further notes that "[u]nderlying the provisions of
this Act is a recognition of the necessity for a comprehensive legislative program dealing not only
with malfeasance and maladministration in the plans, or the consequences of lack of adequate
vesting, but also with the broad spectrum of questions such as adequacy of funding, plant shut
downs and plan terminations, adequate communication to participants, and, in short, the
establishment of certain minimum standards to which all private pension plans must conform if
the private pension promise is to become real rather than illusory." H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 9,
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4647-48.
89. 29 U.S.C. § I132(a)(1)(B) (2006). The statute also creates civil liability under § 1109
where fiduciary obligations are not met. Id. § 1132(a)(2).
90. Id. § 1104(a). The fiduciary, among other things, must discharge his or her duties "with
the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man
acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise
of a like character and with like aims." Id § I 104(a)(1)(B).
91. Id. § 1131. This Section imposes penalties, including up to 10 years imprisonment for the
violation of reporting and disclosure duties and for the making of false statements and
representations. Id.
92. Id. § 100la(a)(3).
93. Salovaara v. Eckert, 222 F.3d 19, 28 (2d Cir. 2000).
94. 935 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1991).
95. Id. at 129.
96. Id. (quoting Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956, 962 (11th Cir. 1986)).
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bring a "civil action . .. to recover benefits due to him under the terms of
his plan [or] to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan[.]" 97 This
language places a valuable, albeit expensive, tool in the litigant's hands,
and, highlighting the need for a fee-shifting provision, the Seventh Circuit
noted that while "Congress wants even small violations of certain laws to
be checked through private litigation . . ., [it] is expensive." 98 Due to the
high cost of bringing suit, the expense of pursuing a claim can surpass the
amount in controversy, complicating the vindication of plan participants'
rights. 99 However, to minimize the burden on plaintiffs and to catalyze
enforcement procedures, Congress permits fee-shifting in ERISA actions-
which empowers litigants to move the court for an award of its attorney's
fees payable by the opposing party. 00
The Seventh Circuit, in Anderson v. AB Painting & Sandblasting,10 1
has reasoned that "[flee-shifting provisions signal Congress' intent that
violations of particular laws be punished, and not just large violations that
would already be checked through the incentives of the American Rule." 1 02
The Anderson court added that "[t]he function of an award of attorney's
fees is to encourage the bringing of meritorious ... claims which might
otherwise be abandoned because of the financial imperatives surrounding
the hiring of competent counsel."10 3 As the Eleventh Circuit warned in
National Cos. Health Benefit Plan v. St. Joseph's Hospital of Atlanta,
Inc., 104 "[w]ith nothing to lose but their own litigation costs, other ERISA-
plan sponsors might find it worthwhile to force underfinanced beneficiaries
to sue them to gain their benefits or accept undervalued settlements." 10 5
Congress included a fee-shifting provision within ERISA to encourage
private enforcement litigation. Although ERISA's remedial purposes are
facilitated by fee-shifting, the United Stated Courts of Appeals disagree on
what showing is sufficient to shift attorney's fees in an ERISA action.
97. 29 U.S.C. § I 132(a)(1)(B).
98. Anderson v. AB Painting & Sandblasting Inc., 578 F.3d 542, 545 (7th Cir. 2009).
99. See, e.g., Tuf Racing Prods., Inc. v. Am. Suzuki Motor Corp., 223 F.3d 585, 592 (7th Cir.
2000) (recognizing the fact that an award of attorney's fees in excess of damages is not decisive
because "one purpose of fee shifting is to enable such claims to be litigated, and the purpose
would be thwarted by capping the attorneys' fees award at the level of the damages award").
100. Brief for Am. Ass'n of Retired Pers. & Nat'I Emp't Lawyers Ass'n as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 7, Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 2149 (2010) (No.
09-448).
101. 578 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 2009).
102. Id. at 545.
103. Id. (quoting City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 578 (1986)).
104. 929 F.2d 1558 (11 th Cir. 1991).
105. Id. at 1575; see also Rivera v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 692, 698 (7th Cir.
1991) (finding that attorney's fees were appropriate where defendants had been "stubborn" in
resisting what was not "a close case").
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2. ERISA Fee-Shifting and the Prevailing Party Requirement Divide
the Federal Circuits
The Court in Hardt granted certiorari in order to consider two
questions.106 First, the Court asked whether the Fourth Circuit was correct
in concluding that Section 1132(g)(1) applies only to prevailing parties. 0 7
Second, the Court inquired into the "circumstances" where a litigant would
be entitled to a fee award.108 Although secondary to the Court's direct
concern in judging these questions, it also noted that "[t]he Courts of
Appeals are divided" as to the first question.109 To explore the extent of the
disagreement between the federal circuits regarding a prevailing party
requirement, cases from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and
D.C. Circuits will be examined in further detail.
It is well settled in the Fourth Circuit that only a prevailing party is
entitled to consideration for attorney's fees in an ERISA action.'' 0 For
example, in Martin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Virginia, Inc.,11 the
Fourth Circuit, ruling on a denial of benefits claim, found that ERISA
contains an implied prevailing party requirement. 112 Before reversing the
district court's award of attorney's fees, the Martin court undertook a
searching analysis of the protocol followed by other Federal Courts of
Appeals when ruling on motions for attorney's fees under Section
1132(g)(1).1 3 Based on its review, the Martin court concluded that its
"sister circuits have imposed a 'prevailing party' limitation on the
availability of attorneys' fees" under ERISA.11 4 However, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in Gibbs v. Gibbs,1 ' explained that the Martin court's
assessment may not be entirely correct. The Fifth Circuit observed that,
106. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 2149, 2155-56 (2010).
107. Id at 2155.
108. Id. at 2155-56.
109. Id. at 2155 n.2. In the same footnote, the Court remarked that "[s]ome [circuits] agree
with the Court of Appeals' conclusion here that only prevailing parties are entitled to fees under
§ 1132(g)(1) ... [while o]ther Courts of Appeals have rejected or disavowed that position." Id.
110. See, e.g., Martin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va. Inc., 115 F.3d 1201, 1210 (4th Cir.
1997) ("We have also suggested, without explicitly holding, that only prevailing parties are
entitled to be considered for an award of attorneys' fees under ERISA."); Freeman v. Cent. States,
Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund, 32 F.3d 90, 94 (4th Cir. 1994) (simultaneously reversing a
judgment in favor of plaintiff and an award of attorney's fees); Elmore v. Cone Mills Corp., 23
F.3d 855, 863 n.8 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining that "reversal of the prior judgment also requires
that we vacate the award of attorneys' fees to Plaintiffs"); Custer v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d
410, 423 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that a plaintiff "must demonstrate more than merely being the
prevailing party on a single issue to demand entitlement to attorney's fees").
111. 115 F.3d 1201 (4th Cir. 1997).
112. Id. at 1210.
113. Id.
114. Id
115. 210 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2000).
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while several circuits find prevailing party status to be a sufficient basis for
awarding attorney's fees, prevailing party status is not always a prerequisite
for such an award.1 16 Specifically, the Gibbs court noted that "many of the
circuits, while stating that awards of attorneys' fees are appropriate for
prevailing parties in ERISA actions, do not in so stating, foreclose the
ability of non-prevailing parties to obtain an award of fees."1 17
i. The Court ofAppeals for the First Circuit
To support its claim that other circuits have found that prevailing party
status is a prerequisite for an award of attorney's fees, the Martin court cites
Cottrill v. Sparrow, Johnson & Ursillo, Inc.,1 18 a First Circuit case that
declares that fee awards are determined by employing a five factor test. The
relevant factors include:
(1) the degree of culpability or bad faith attributable to
the losing party; (2) the depth of the losing party's pocket,
i.e., his or her capacity to pay an award; (3) the extent (if at
all) to which such an award would deter other persons
acting under similar circumstances; (4) the benefit (if any)
that the successful suit confers on plan participants or
beneficiaries generally; and (5) the relative merit of the
parties' positions. 19
Cottrill is the only First Circuit case cited by the Martin court in
support of its position. By contrast, however, other First Circuit precedent
holds that attorney's fees are normally available to the prevailing party, but
are not exclusively available to it. 120 Furthermore, the Cottrill decision is
not wholly supportive of the Martin court's position. Indeed, the First
Circuit noted in Cottrill that "ERISA does not provide for a virtually
automatic award of attorneys' fees to prevailing plaintiffs."'21 Instead, the
opinion stressed that fee shifting under ERISA is wholly within the court's
discretion. 122 The First Circuit previously explained that the five-factor test
employed in Cottrill applies with equal force to prevailing plaintiffs and
defendants alike. 123 Although Martin identifies the test used by the First
Circuit in evaluating motions for attorney's fees under Section 1132(g)(1),
116. Id. at 501.
117. Id.
118. 100 F.3d 220 (1st Cir. 1996).
119. Id.at225.
120. Doe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 53, 61 (1st Cir. 1999).
121. Cottrill, 100 F.3d at 225.
122. Id
123. Gray v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251, 258 (1st Cir. 1986).
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further cases highlight the power given to the judiciary to award fees to
either party at its discretion.
ii. The Court ofAppeals for the Third Circuit
As evidence of a prevailing party requirement in the Third Circuit,
Martin points to McPherson v. Employees' Pension Plan of American Re-
Insurance Co. 124 In McPherson, the court recognized that "[a]ttorneys' fees
may be awarded to prevailing parties in actions brought under [ERISA]."l 25
A recent case also held that ERISA "provides that fees may be awarded to a
prevailing litigant upon a showing, inter alia, of culpability or bad faith of
the party in violation of the statute."1 26
While McPherson provides a test similar to that used by the First
Circuit, 127 the Third Circuit, as stated in Anthuis v. Colt Industries
Operating Corp.,128 does not "automatically mandate an award to a
prevailing party."l 29 Moreover, in Ellison v. Shenango Inc. Pension
Board1 30 the court made clear that "[w]e do not think a presumption in
favor of granting attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs is required or
appropriate under [Section 1132(g)(1)]."l 3 ' Martin highlights that fee-
shifting is appropriate for a prevailing party. However, similar to the case
law of the First Circuit, the law in the Third Circuit suggests that prevailing
in the litigation is not a necessary element of, but is simply sufficient for, a
successful motion for attorney's fees under ERISA.
iii. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Martin cites Boggs v. Boggsl32 as support for the fact that ERISA
contains a prevailing party requirement based on language in that case
which indicates that ERISA "allows the court to award ERISA
124. 33 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 1994).
125. Id. at 254.
126. Fields v. Thompson Printing Co., 363 F.3d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 2004).
127. McPherson, 33 F.3d at 254. In the Third Circuit, the factors relevant to attorney's fee
awards are:
(1) the offending parties' culpability or bad faith; (2) the ability of the
offending parties to satisfy an award of attorneys' fees; (3) the deterrent
effect of an award of attorneys' fees against the offending parties; (4) the
benefit conferred on members of the pension plan as a whole; and (5) the
relative merits of the parties' position.
Id.
128. 971 F.2d 999 (3d Cir. 1992).
129. Id. at 1010.
130. 956 F.2d 1268 (3d Cir. 1992).
131. Id. at 1275.
132. 82 F.3d 90 (5th Cir. 1996).
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beneficiaries, participants, and fiduciaries reasonable attorney's fees and
costs when they are the prevailing party."1 33 However, in Gibbs v. Gibbs13 4
and Todd v. AIG Life Insurance Co. 135 the Fifth Circuit repudiates the
Martin court's conclusion. The Gibbs court found that "the greater weight
of authority, from outside and within our own circuit, supports the notion
that a party need not prevail in order to be eligible for an award of
attorneys' fees under §1132(g)(1) of ERISA."l 36 Similarly, in Todd, the
court noted that "ERISA does not use the prevailing party language in its
attorneys' fees provision."137 Instead of directing that fees are automatically
awarded upon one party showing that it has prevailed, the Todd court
presented a two-step analysis for courts to follow when ruling on a motion
for attorney's fees. 138 Under Todd, the court should first apply the five-
factor test to determine if the party is eligible for an award of attorney's
fees. 139 Second, it must determine the amount of the fee award by using the
loadstar method. 140 Despite "a strong presumption that the court will award
costs to the prevailing party,"1 41 the case law from the Fifth Circuit
suggests that a fee award is available to both parties in an action under
Section 1132(g)(1) and is not restricted solely to the prevailing plaintiff.142
133. Id. at 94 n.l
134. 210 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2000).
135. 47 F.3d 1448 (5th Cir. 1995).
136. Gibbs, 210 F.3d at 503.
137. Todd, 47 F.3d at 1459 (internal quotations omitted).
138. Id.
139. Id. The five-factor test varies slightly between circuits, but the test referenced here is the
test used in Iron Workers Local # 272 v. Bowen, 624 F.2d 1255, 1266 (5th Cir. 1980).
Specifically, a court must consider:
(1) the degree of culpability or bad faith on the part of the opposing party; (2)
the ability of the opposing party to satisfy any award; (3) the deterrent value
of the award to those acting in circumstances similar to the opposing party's;
(4) whether the fee requesting party sought to benefit all participants and
beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to resolve a significant legal question
regarding ERISA itself; and (5) the relative merits of the parties' positions.
Id
140. Todd, 47 F.3d at 1459. The loadstar method, a commonly used method to calculate the
amount of attorney's fees, "is accomplished by multiplying the number of hours expended on the
matters at issue in the case by a reasonable hourly rate." Id.; see also Salley v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 966 F.2d 1011, 1017 (5th Cir. 1992) (describing the calculation of a reasonable
fee).
141. Salley, 966 F.2d at 1017.
142. See supra notes 132-140 and accompanying text.
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iv. The Court ofAppeals for the Seventh Circuit
From the Seventh Circuit, Martin cites Little v. Cox's
Supermarkets,143 which states "the bottom-line question" when ruling on a
fee award-whether "the losing party's position [was] substantially
justified and taken in good faith."1 44 Accordingly, in the Seventh Circuit,
Little holds that there is a weak presumption that a prevailing party is
entitled to a fee award. 145 The Seventh Circuit has also reversed a motion
for attorney's fees where it has first reversed its judgment on the merits
because the moving party no longer qualifies as prevailing, and on that
basis, cannot be eligible for a fee award. 146
Other Seventh Circuit decisions indicate, however, that the court does
not automatically award fees to a prevailing party.147 Rather, it follows one
of two procedures for ruling on a motion for attorney's fees "after [a party]
has attained prevailing party status."l 48 Either the court must
look[] at the following five factors: 1) the degree of the
offending parties' culpability or bad faith; 2) the degree of
the ability of the offending parties to satisfy personally an
award of attorney's fees; 3) whether or not an award of
attorney's fees against the offending parties would deter
other persons acting under similar circumstances; 4) the
amount of benefit conferred on members of the pension
plan as a whole; and 5) the relative merits of the parties'
positions' 49
or it must "look[] to whether or not the losing party's position was
'substantially justified."'o5 0 The Seventh Circuit has also noted that while a
court may be more likely to grant a motion for attorney's fees to a
prevailing as opposed to a non-prevailing party, it is not strictly necessary
for a party to prevail in order to succeed in fee-shifting under Section
1132(g).151 The review of cases from the Seventh Circuit suggests that
courts enjoy far more discretion when awarding attorney's fees than the
Fourth Circuit in Martin represents.
143. 71 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995).
144. Id. at 644 (emphasis added).
145. Id.
146. Trustmark Life Ins. Co. v. Univ. of Chi. Hosps., 207 F.3d 876, 884 (7th Cir. 2000).
147. See infra notes 148-151 and accompanying text.
148. Quinn v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n, 161 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir. 1998).
149. Id
150. Id (quoting Bittner v. Sadoff & Rudoy Indus., 728 F.2d 820, 830 (7th Cir. 1984)). The
court has also found that the "principles that sometimes entitle a party to recover his attorneys'
fees limit that entitlement to prevailing parties." Poteete v. Capital Eng'g Inc., 185 F.3d 804, 807-
08 (7th Cir. 1999).
151. Marquardt v. N. Am. Car Corp., 652 F.2d 715, 718 n.2 (7th Cir. 1981).
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v. The Court ofAppeals for the Ninth Circuit
Martin cites, as support for its position that courts may award
attorney's fee to "prevailing parties" only, Flanagan v. Inland Empire
Electrical Workers Pension Plan & Trust.152 In Flanagan, the Ninth Circuit
stated in dictum that the ERISA fee provision "permits an award of fees to a
non-prevailing party," but also found that "plaintiffs cannot recover fees
under section 1132(g)(1) until they 'succeed on any significant issue in
litigation which achieves some of the benefit [they] sought in bringing
suit."' 1 53 Other Ninth Circuit precedent holds that "[s]uccessful plaintiffs in
ERISA suits should ordinarily recover fees unless special circumstances
would render such an award unjust."l54 Although Martin cites Flanagan as
an example of a prevailing party requirement,155 the Ninth Circuit has also
held that fee awards under ERISA "do not rely on the prevailing-party
doctrine,"156 and that ERISA does not foreclose the possibility of attorney's
fees for non-prevailing parties.157 Further, the court has also noted "that
Congress has permitted an award of fees to a non-prevailing party in
ERISA cases." 158 Like its sister circuits before it, the state of the law in the
Ninth Circuit is not as one dimensional as its portrait in Martin suggests.
Rather than conclusively supporting a prevailing party requirement, the
Ninth Circuit's case law tracks ERISA's language and allows a fee award to
"either party."
vi. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Martin highlights that under Eddy v. Colonial Life Insurance Co. of
America,159 the District of Columbia Circuit considers "the losing party's
culpability or bad faith" and "the losing party's ability to satisfy a fee
award" when ruling on a motion for attorney's fees under Section
1132(g)(1). 160 Like several of its sister circuits, some D.C. Circuit
precedent provides that a prevailing party should win on a motion for
attorney's fees absent extenuating factors rendering the award unfair. 16 1
152. 3 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 1993).
153. Id. at 1253 (quoting Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust, 746 F.2d 587, 589 (9th Cir.
1984)).
154. Elliot v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 1138, 1148 (9th Cir. 2003).
155. Martin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., Inc., 115 F.3d 1201, 1210 (4th Cir. 1997).
156. Sokol v. Bernstein, 812 F.2d 559, 561 (9th Cir. 1987).
157. D'Emanuele v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 904 F.2d 1379, 1382 (9th Cir. 1990).
158. Id. at 1383.
159. 59 F.3d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
160. Id at 206 (emphasis added).
161. See, e.g., Grand Union Co. v. Food Emp'rs Labor Relations Ass'n, 808 F.2d 66, 71 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (noting that one of the attorneys' fee award standards applied in the context of civil
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Other D.C. Circuit cases however, when ruling on motions for
attorney's fees, focus on the financial protection ERISA provides.' 6 2 When
statutes that protect economic interests contain a fee-shifting provision, the
D.C. Circuit does not apply a presumption in favor of the prevailing
party. 163 The D.C. Circuit has moved away from the "presumption that
attorneys' fees should be awarded to a prevailing party absent exceptional
circumstances,"1 64  and instead applies a five-factor test1 65  without
presuming that attorney's fees are precluded for non-prevailing parties.166
The questions presented to the Supreme Court in Hardt concerned the
Fourth Circuit's interpretation of Section 1132(g)(1). While the Fourth
Circuit has imposed a prevailing party requirement onto the plain statutory
language, other Federal Courts of Appeals have either disagreed with this
reasoning or have agreed with it only in part. The Hardt Court does not
address the division between the circuits per se, but by grounding its
holding in a textual analysis of ERISA, the Court clarifies the ambiguity
within the statutory text while also resolving the exact questions presented
to it.
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co., 167 the United States
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, holding that there is no express prevailing
party requirement for the award of attorney's fees in an action under
Section 1132(g)(1) of ERISA.168 Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas
explained that an implied prevailing party requirement was contrary to the
rights actions calls for awarding them to "prevailing plaintiffs 'unless special circumstances would
render such an award unjust"') .
162. See, e.g., Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Am., 59 F.3d 201, 205 (distinguishing between
attorneys' fee award provisions in civil rights statutes versus those in statutes protecting economic
interests).
163. Id.
164. Becker v. Weinberg Grp., Inc., 554 F. Supp. 2d 9, 15 (D.D.C. 2008).
165. Id The five-factor test in question comes from the Ninth Circuit case, Hummell v. S.E.
Rykoff& Co., 634 F.2d 446, 453 (9th Cir. 1980). The factors are:
(1) the degree of the opposing parties' culpability or bad faith; (2) the ability
of the opposing parties to satisfy an award of fees; (3) whether an award of
fees against the opposing parties would deter others from acting under
similar circumstances; (4) whether the parties requesting fees sought to
benefit all participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to resolve a
significant legal question regarding ERISA; and (5) the relative merits of the
parties' positions.
Id.
166. Becker, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 15.
167. 130 S. Ct. 2149 (2010).
168. Id. at 2152.
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plain text of the statute. 169 Justice Thomas further provided that as long as a
party has achieved "some degree of success on the merits,"1 70 it may move
for attorney's fees under Section 1132(g)(1) because that Section of the
statute directly provides for a fee award to "either party."'71
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Thomas first examined the
statutory language at issue. 172 Noting specifically that the Court must
"enforce plain and unambiguous statutory language according to [the
statute's] terms,"l 73 he made explicit that "[t]he words 'prevailing party' do
not appear" in Section 1 132(g)(1).1 74 In direct contrast, Justice Thomas
cited Section 1132(g)(2)(D), which states that "only plaintiffs who obtain 'a
judgment in favor of the plan' 75 may seek attorney's fees[,]" as support for
the proposition "that Congress knows how to impose express limits on the
availability of attorney's fees in ERISA cases."1 76 Had Congress wished to
provide a prevailing party requirement, it would have done so plainly-as
evidenced by the express inclusion of language creating a similar limitation
in Section 1 132(g)(2)(D).1 77 Comparing these Sections allowed the Court to
find that "a fee claimant need not be a 'prevailing party' to be eligible for
an attorney's fees award under § 1132(g)(1)."l 78
Justice Thomas acknowledged that under the American Rule "[e]ach
litigant pays his own attorney's fees, win or lose" 179 and that the rule is
subject to statutory modification.180 As a result, Justice Thomas interpreted
Section 1132(g)(1) in light of the Court's precedent regarding statutory
deviations from the American Rule that do not expressly require prevailing
party status.181 Relying on its decision in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club,182
Justice Thomas asked whether "Congress . . . 'meant to abandon historic
169. Id
170. Id.
171. Id. (emphasis added). It remains within the discretion of the court whether to award fees
and costs. Id.
172. Id at 2156.
173. Id
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See id (suggesting that "[tihe contrast between these two paragraphs makes clear that
Congress knows how to impose express limits on the availability of attorney's fees in ERISA
cases").
178. Id.
179. Id. at 2157.
180. Id.
181. Id
182. 463 U.S. 680 (1983).
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fee-shifting principles and intuitive notions of fairness."' 1 83 Based on that
test, the Court found that "a fees claimant must show 'some degree of
success on the merits"' in order to obtain an award of attorney's fees under
§ 1132(g)(1)1 84 and explained that "[a] claimant does not satisfy [this]
requirement by achieving 'trivial success on the merits' or by winning a
'purely procedural victor[y]."'" 85 A claimant may, however, satisfy the
"some degree of success on the merits" requirement when a court could
label the outcome of the litigation a success without a "lengthy inquir[y]
into the question whether a party's success was 'substantial' or occurred on
a 'central issue."' 86
Referring to the district court's findings that Reliance failed to meet
ERISA's standards and its statement that it would rule for Ms. Hardt if
remand proved to be an insufficient remedy,1 87 the Court concluded that
"[t]hese facts establish that Hardt has achieved far more than 'trivial
success on the merits' or a 'purely procedural victory."' 8 8 Finally, the
Court recognized that the "District Court properly exercised its discretion to
award Hardt attorney's fees in this case."189 The Court declined to
"decide . . . whether a remand order, without more, constitutes 'some
degree of success on the merits' sufficient to make a party eligible for
attorney's fees under §1 132(g)(1)."' 90
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment and with Parts I and II of
the opinion.191 Justice Stevens did not join Part III because he found that
the Court's opinion in Ruckelshaus "should [not] be given any special
weight in the interpretation of this-or any other-different statutory
provision."192 Emphasizing that Ruckelshaus was "closely divided" and
turned on the reading of the Clean Air Act's specific legislative history,
Justice Stevens stressed that he would "examine the text, structure, and
history" of any federal statute providing for the award of attorney's fees
183. Hardt, 130 S. Ct. at 2158 (quoting Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 686). In Ruckelshaus, the
Court interpreted a Section of the Clean Air Act that allows attorney's fees "whenever it
determines that such an award is appropriate." Id. at 2157.
184. Id. at 2158.
185. Id.
186. Id. (quoting Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 688 n.9).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 2159.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 2159. The Court reached this decision "[b]ecause these [aforementioned]
conclusions resolve[d] th[e] case," so it determined that it "need not decide today whether a
remand order, without more, constitutes some 'success on the merits' . . . ." Id.
191. Id. at 2159 (Stevens, J., concurring). Part I of the Court's opinion relayed the facts of the
case, id. at 2152-56, and Part II concerned the statutory language and the Court's textual analysis.
Id. at 2156.
192. Id. at 2159.
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before using Ruckelshaus for guidance to determine if the two statutes
shared a similar Congressional intent, thereby rendering the comparison
between the two judicially useful. 193 Although Justice Stevens argued that
the Court's reliance on Ruckelshaus was misplaced, he concurred with the
majority on the larger point that Section 1132(g)(1) "does not impose a
'prevailing party' requirement."' 94
IV. ANALYSIS
In Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co.,195 the United States
Supreme Court held that a party must enjoy "some degree of success on the
merits" before attorney's fees may be awarded under Section 1132(g)(1) of
ERISA.196 In so holding, the Court correctly followed its precedent
concerning statutory deviations from the American Rule and resolved a
disagreement between the federal circuits on ERISA fee awards. 197
However, by failing to address the impact of a remand order under its
newly announced standard, the Court placed a significant restriction on the
victory it crafted for ERISA plaintiffs.' 98 If the Court had found that a
remand order satisfies the "some degree of success on the merits" test, it
could have added clarity to this important aspect of ERISA litigation
without the delay required for a representative case to be fully
adjudicated.1 99
A. Ruckelshaus Is the Correct Legal Standard for Determining Fee
Awards Under Section 1132(g)(1)
In his concurrence in Hardt, Justice Stevens argued that Ruckelshaus
should not apply because the legislative history of ERISA and the Clean Air
Act are not similar enough to permit meaningful comparison.200 In the
Court of Appeals' decision in Hardt, Chief Judge Wilkinson and Circuit
Judge Faber, who sat by designation, took this position further. Instead of
applying Ruckelshaus to the Hardt facts, Judges Wilkinson and Faber
considered Ms. Hardt's motion for attorney's fees under the standard set
forth by the United States Supreme Court in Buckhannon Board & Care
193. Id
194. Id
195. 130 S. Ct. 2149 (2010).
196. Id at 2158.
197. See infra Part IV.A.
198. See infra Part IV.B.I.
199. See infra Part IV.B.ll.
200. Hardt, 130 S. Ct. at 2159 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Home, Inc., v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources.201
In Buckhannon, petitioners sought a fee award under the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA")202 and the Americans With
Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"). 203 Under the FHAA, "the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee
and costs." 204 Similarly, under the ADA, "the court . .. in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party . .. a reasonable attorney's fee, including
litigation expenses, and costs." 205
Justice Thomas explained in his majority opinion, however, that
because the language of those statutes contains a prevailing party
requirement, Buckhannon cannot govern the facts of Hardt.206 In other
words, because ERISA (the statute under which attorney's fees were sought
in Hardt) contains no prevailing party requirement, Buckhannon (where
attorney's fees were sought under the FHAA and ADA-each of which
contains a prevailing party requirement) is not applicable to Hardt. This
observation reflects a textual distinction between the statutes that demands
different standards of application. 207 Indeed, the Supreme Court has
201. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 336 F. App'x 332, 336 (4th Cir. 2009), rev'd,
130 S. Ct. 2149 (2010). Buckhannon raises several interesting legal issues not central to the
discussion here. One of them is the Catalyst theory of damages, under which "plaintiffs [may be]
eligible for attorney's fees if their lawsuit provoked the change they sought in their complaint,"
despite a lack of formal judgment in the plaintiffs favor. Paul D. Reingold, Requiem for Section
1983, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 31 (2008). Every circuit except the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit embraces some version of the Catalyst theory. Erwin
Chemerinsky, Losing Faith: The Supreme Court and the Abandonment of the Adjudicatory
Process, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1129, 1140 (2009).
202. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2006).
203. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
204. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2).
205. 42 U.S.C. § 12205.
206. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 2149, 2157 (2010). Buckhannon is
not applicable in this case. For an in-depth discussion of where the impact of Buckhannon will
continue to be felt, see generally Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural
Attack on Civil Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54
UCLA L. REV. 1087 (2007).
207. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1761 (2010)
(recognizing that principles of statutory construction demand that the courts construe statutes to
avoid "absurd results"); Bradford C. Mank, Textualism's Selective Cannons of Statutory
Construction: Reinvigorating Individual Liberties, Legislative Authority, and Deference to
Executive Agencies, 86 KY. L.J. 527, 534-35 (1998) (recognizing that "Congress makes a very
clear statement in the text of its intent"); Thomas W. Merrill, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Pluralist
Theory, and the Interpretation of Statutes, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 621, 647-48 (1994) (noting that while
the broad language used by Congress in the Clean Air Act could have been interpreted as a blank
check for the judiciary, Chief Justice Rehnquist "[i]nstead ... framed the inquiry in terms of the
general understanding associated with the American Rule prohibiting any fee shifting absent
special legislative authorization" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lucia A. Silecchia, The
Catalyst Calamity: Post-Buckhannon Fee-Shifting in Environmental Litigation and a Proposal
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previously acknowledged that, "[a] contrast between the language used
in . .. two standards .. . certainly indicate[s] that Congress intended the two
standards to differ." 208 Additionally, the Court has also commented that
"[t]he assumption of inadvertent omission [of necessary language] is
rendered especially suspect upon close consideration of ERISA's
interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent remedial scheme, which is in
turn part of a 'comprehensive and reticulated statute."' 209 Because of the
plain textual differences between the fee-shifting language in the statutes at
issue in Hardt and Buckhannon, it was error for the Fourth Circuit to
consider Ms. Hardt's motion for attorney's fees under Buckhannon. Instead,
the correct guidance for the question posed by Hardt is found in
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club.
Buckhannon, like Ruckelshaus, begins with the recognition that under
the American Rule, courts generally do not award attorney's fees to
prevailing parties without statutory authorization. 210 However the two cases
depart at the point where Justice Rehnquist notes in Buckhannon that
Congress chose the legal term of art-prevailing party-to govern
attorneys' fees litigation under the FHAA and ADA. 211 By contrast, in
Ruckelshaus, Justice Rehnquist, considered the fee-shifting issue from the
perspective Congress would have used, had it explicitly addressed the
issue.212 Justice Rehnquist then looked to other statutes that contained fee-
shifting provisions in order to demonstrate that fee awards are normally
reserved for prevailing parties only. 213
This discussion warrants three powerful conclusions. First, the textual
differences between the attorney's fee language used in the FHAA and
ADA, and in ERISA, demand that the court employ specifically tailored
legal standards if any distinction between the two is to be maintained.2 14
for Congressional Action, 29 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 1, 23 (2004) (noting that "importantly, .
Ruckelshaus addressed the distinction between the 'whenever . . . appropriate' standard and the
'prevailing party' standard[s]" relating to when a court may award attorneys' fees).
208. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987).
209. Ma. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985) (quoting Nachman Corp. v.
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)).
210. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S.
598, 602 (2001).
211. Id. at 603.
212. Merrill, supra note 207, at 647-48.
213. Id. at 648.
214. This principle is related to the maxim "[1]nclusio unius est exclusio alterius," which
translates to "inclusion of the one is exclusion of the other." Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive
Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REv. 109, 117 (2010). For a discussion of the common
law origins of commonplace cannons of statutory interpretation, see generally William N.
Eskridge, Jr. All About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial Power" in Statutory
Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 990 (2001). Even though the standard in
Buckhannon contemplates a Catalyst theory of attorney's fees and cannot apply because it governs
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Second, because the Ruckelshaus court began its decision by referencing
the American Rule, it was compelled to require "some degree of success on
the merits" even where Congress had purportedly vested the power to
award attorney's fees entirely in the judiciary.2 15 Third, by requiring the
federal courts to judge motions for attorney's fees under the "some degree
of success on the merits" standard necessitated by Ruckelshaus, the Court
resolved the difference between the federal courts of appeals as evidenced
by the review of Martin and the additional federal decisions.216
B. By Failing to Rule that a Remand Order Is Sufficient to Satisfy the
"Some Degree ofSuccess on the Merits" Standard, the Court Harmed
ERISA Plaintiffs
Although ERISA includes an array of tools for the plaintiffs benefit
within its remedial structure, several limitations place a high value on the
availability of attorney's fees. 217 Further, because ERISA preempts state
enforcement actions, it provides the sole remedy for plan beneficiaries. 218
Attorney's fees provide a powerful aid in the litigation process and help
only statutes that award fees to prevailing parties, it is possible that Ms. Hardt would have
succeeded anyway because she qualifies as a "prevailing party" within the meaning established by
the case law. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9-10,
Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 2149 (2010) (No. 09-448) (arguing that since
the court retained jurisdiction over Reliance in order to compel it to act in accordance with its
obligations under ERISA in the event remand proved unsatisfactory, the test in Buckhannon is
satisfied and Ms. Hardt qualifies as a prevailing party).
215. An attorney's fees analysis under the American Rule is grounded in the conclusion that a
litigant cannot be entitled to a fee award where there has not been at least some modicum of
success on the merits, even where Congress has given the court discretion to determine whether a
fee award is appropriate. See Walter B. Russell, III & Paul Thomas Gregory, Note, Awards of
Attorney's Fees in Environmental Litigation: Citizen Suits and the "Appropriate" Standard, 18
GA. L. REV. 307, 322-23 (1984) ("Unlike the 'prevailing' standard, the 'appropriate' standard
does not by its terms require any success as a prerequisite to an award of fees .. . [allthough the
Supreme Court in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club has rejected this reading of the appropriate
standard[.]") (footnotes omitted)).
216. See supra Part II.B.2.
217. See, e.g., Anderson v. Procter & Gamble Co., 220 F.3d 449, 452 (6th Cir. 2000)
(recognizing that "ERISA [does] not permit [a plaintiff] to recover attorneys' fees for work
performed during the administrative appeals process"); Smith v. Sydnor, 184 F.3d 356, 364 (4th
Cir. 1999) (noting that the "courts of appeals are in near unanimity that exhaustion of
administrative remedies is required before a plaintiff can bring an ERISA action in federal court to
recover benefits under a plan"); Anderson v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 2:01cv894-ID, 2007
WL 604728, at *6 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 22, 2007) (noting that ERISA does not allow either punitive or
extra-contractual damages); John H. Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law: The
Unum/Provident Scandal and Judicial Review of Benefits Decisions Under ERISA, 101 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1315, 1342 (2007) (discussing the impact that conflicts of interest and standards of review
have on ERISA plaintiffs).
218. See, e.g., Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 41 (1987) ("The 'pre-emption
clause' (§ 514(a)) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) provides
that ERISA supersedes all state laws insofar as they 'relate to any employee benefit plan. . . .').
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ensure that plan administrators comply with their legal obligations under
the statute. 219 Without the assistance that fee awards provide, many
plaintiffs would be kept out of court because the cost of litigating generally
exceeds the dollar amount of the benefits in controversy, at least for most
non-class action ERISA litigation. 220 Although Ruckelshaus compels only a
showing of "some degree of success on the merits," the uncertainty
regarding who qualifies under this standard could work hardship upon
ERISA plaintiffs. 221 ERISA provides a valuable set of protections for
pensioners and plan beneficiaries. At the same time, since it preempts all
other avenues of judicial redress, making ERISA actions widely available
and easily accessible to those in need of its remedial protection is extremely
important. A key aspect of this protection, in addition to agency
enforcement, is the private right of action. Since the fee-shifting provision
fosters ERISA enforcement, it follows that clarifying the standard for fee-
awards facilitates litigation while also lowering the price that ERISA
plaintiffs pay to enforce their rights.
Fee awards play a critical role in enabling the enforcement scheme
contemplated by Congress. 222 ERISA was designed to protect the value in
pension plans and to preserve the rights of injured persons to bring actions
in the federal courts. 223 Because of ERISA's goals, any delay in clarifying
219. See, e.g., Nat'l Cos. Health Benefit Plan v. St. Joseph's Hosp. of Atlanta, Inc., 929 F.2d
1558, 1575 (11 th Cir. 1991) (finding that "the deterrent value of an award of attorneys' fees ... is
high [in ERISA cases] . . . [because without it a defendant] would only be liable for what it should
have covered before this litigation commenced").
220. Cf Brief for Am. Ass'n of Retired Pers. & Nat'l Emp't Lawyers Ass'n as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, supra note 100, at 23 (arguing that "benefit amounts are relatively small as
compared with the potential costs of litigation, thus effectively precluding the use of contingency
fee agreements").
221. Any increase in the probability that a plaintiff will be unable to recover attorney's fees
decreases the chances that the suit will ever be filed. A persons' belief as to whether or not a fee
award will be available influences his or her understanding of how risky the lawsuit may be, and
what the chances are that, once litigation has concluded, he or she will be left to satisfy his or her
own attorney's fees. See, e.g., Donald R. Philbin, Jr., The One Minute Manager Prepares for
Mediation: A Multidisciplinary Approach to Negotiation Preparation, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
249, 277 (2008) ("Even if the chances of success are held constant, some people are risk-takers
and others are risk-adverse."). For an interesting discussion on how information, or, more
accurately perfect information, shapes behavior preferences, see id. at 283-84.
222. See Ann C. Bertino, Comment, The Need for a Mandatory Award of Attorney's Fees for
Prevailing Plaintiffs in ERISA Benefits Cases, 41 CATH. U. L. REv. 871, 886-87 (1992) (noting
the practical difficulties of agency enforcement and highlighting the role private actions play in
ERISA enforcement litigation).
223. Justin Cummins & Meg Luger Nikolai, ERISA Reform in a Post-Enron World, 39 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 563, 574 (2006) (recognizing that by enacting ERISA "Congress intended to
maximize financial security for retirees and their families"); Brendan S. Maher, Creating a
Paternalistic Market for Legal Rules Affecting the Benefit Promise, 2009 Wis. L. REV. 657, 661
(noting that "ERISA, through a series of expansive statutory definitions inspired by the law of
202
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the legal standard under which motions for attorney's fees will be decided
works hardships on ERISA plaintiffs in proportion to the amount that the
newly injected uncertainty discourages enforcement litigation.224
Fee awards act as a legal subsidy.225 By statutorily allowing for fee
awards, Congress made the conscious choice to value its enforcement
scheme over the right of plan administrators to violate ERISA's
provisions. 226 This Congressional decision simultaneously lowers the cost
of ERISA litigation and incentivizes plaintiffs to bring claims in order to
protect their pension rights. 227 However, Hardt's "some degree of success"
test has an impact on the subsidy provided by Section 1 132(g)(1) because it
constricts the supply of readily available fee awards. Any confusion over
what does or does not meet this test increases the price of ERISA litigation,
decreases the effectiveness of the subsidy provision, and harms those
plaintiffs who would have brought suit to enforce their rights if the decision
to litigate involved less risk regarding the applicability of Section
1 132(g)(1).
trusts, federalized benefit promises [defined as employer promises of deferred compensation] ...
in order to provide benefit 'security').
224. John Leubsdorf Recovering Attorney Fees as Damages, 38 RUTGERS L. REV. 439, 441
(1986) (concluding that the effect of making fee-shifting more difficult "is to discourage litigation
by plaintiffs and defendants whose chances of success appear relatively small, whose opponents
have larger litigation expenses than they do, or who are more averse than their opponents to the
risk of being held liable for costs"); Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the
Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 591 (1997)
(discussing the notion that actors know "the harms that they cause will not be of sufficient
importance to be worth a typical victim's while to pursue").
225. Subsidies generally work to spread the economic burden of providing a good or service
and are widely used over a diverse spectrum. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, We Could Pass a Law. .
. What Might Happen If Contingent Legal Fees Were Banned, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 321, 335
(1998) (noting that "the cost of legal aid (in a fee-shifting regime) would be comparatively cheap:
a public subsidy equivalent to the private litigation insurance premiums the rest of us would pay").
But cf Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shifting and Incentives to Comply with the Law, 46 VAND. L. REV.
1069, 1073-74 (1993) (discussing objections to the theory of subsidy and outlining an optimal
fee-shifting rule). For an interesting look at the nature of subsidy in our legal system, see generally
Brendan S. Maher, The Civil Judicial Subsidy, 85 IND. L.J. 1527 (2010) (describing the rationales
behind the idea of the judicial system as a subsidy).
226. A person may have the right to pursue a course of action, even if it is in contravention of
the law. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Market Damages, Efficient Contracting, and
the Economic Waste Fallacy, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1610, 1667 (describing market damages when
a seller prefers contract performance and when the seller prefers a breach of contract); Caroline 0.
Shoenberger, Consumer Myths v. Legal Realities: How Can Businesses Cope?, 16 LOv.
CONSUMER L. REV. 189, 205 n. 103 (2004) (describing how, as a matter of contract law, a party
always has the right to void a contract and incur the requisite liability for damages).
227. The lower the cost or the greater the reward, the more of an item a consumer will prefer.
In this case, if the cost of ERISA litigation is decreased, the investor will prefer it to higher cost
options with similar risk profiles. See, e.g., William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of
Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425, 429 (1964) (describing how
investors maximize utility as a function of cost versus expected return and risk).
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1. The Remand Order as a Discrete Point on the Spectrum Between
100% Victory and "Some Degree of Success on the Merits"
In Hardt, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia deemed the case to be one where the plan administrator failed to
meet the standard of care under ERISA and therefore remanded the case to
Reliance, providing it with the opportunity to "fully and adequately assess"
the denied claim.228 In light of the facts and under the mandate of Weaver v.
Phoenix Home Life Mutual Insurance Co.,229 the district court correctly
remanded the case in order to allow Reliance the opportunity to
comprehensively and fairly review its decision. 230 Remand orders are a
popular remedy in ERISA cases. For example, the First Circuit has
recognized that "despite the fact that [ERISA] ... does not explicitly
authorize administrative remand as a remedy. . . [n]umerous decisions by
this court and others have ordered, or approved the theory .. . and we have
seen none holding that remand is impermissible." 231 Other Circuits have
crafted their own remand jurisprudence, which defines when a remand
order is the appropriate remedy. 232
Although remand is a favored remedy, the federal courts of appeals
disagree over whether remand constitutes an appealable judgment sufficient
to warrant the award of attorney's fees.233 This circuit split complicates the
impact Hardt will have going forward to the extent that a remand order falls
somewhere along the remedy spectrum in-between points on either
extreme-complete success and outright dismissal.234 Ruckelshaus teaches
228. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 540 F. Supp. 2d 656, 664 (E.D. Va. 2008),
rev'd, 336 F. App'x 332 (4th Cir. 2009), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 2149 (2010).
229. 990 F.2d 154 (4th Cir. 1993).
230. Id. at 159 (referencing Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1007 n.4 (4th Cir.
1985)).
231. Buffonge v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 426 F.3d 20, 31 n.14 (1st Cir. 2005).
232. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 287 F.3d 1276, 1288 (10th Cir. 2002)
(noting that "[t]he remedy when an ERISA administrator fails to make adequate findings or to
explain adequately the grounds of her decision is to remand the case to the administrator for
further findings or explanation."); Saffle v. Sierra Pac. Power Co. Bargaining Unit Long Term
Disability Income Plan, 85 F.3d 455, 461 (9th Cir. 1996) (making explicit "that remand for
reevaluation of the merits of a claim is the correct course to follow when an ERISA plan
administrator, with discretion to apply a plan, has misconstrued the Plan and applied a wrong
standard to a benefits determination").
233. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 214, at 28
n.8. The First, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have found that such orders are not final, the
Ninth and Tenth Circuits make a case-by-case determination, and the Seventh Circuit has held that
they do constitute final action. Id.
234. Theoretically, a remand order falls somewhere between the traditional standards of
prevailing party cases and outright dismissal. The "prevailing party" standard is satisfied "only
when a party has prevailed on the merits of at least some of his claims . . . [and] there [has] been a
determination of the substantial rights of the parties, which Congress determined was a necessary
foundation for departing from the usual rule in this country that each party is to bear the expense
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that outright dismissal is not a result sufficient to entitle a party to a fee
award.235 Outright victory, however, or some other measure of the relief
sought compelled by judicial order, will qualify for award eligibility under
the Hardt test.236 Two issues remain unresolved. First, whether or not a
remand order satisfies Hardt, and second, how long it will take for a
representative case on the question to reach the Supreme Court.
2. A Remand Order, Without More, Will Likely Satisfy Hardt, but the
Time Required to Judicially Recognize this Fact Will Work to the Detriment
of ERISA Plaintiffs
It remains unknown when, or if, the United States Supreme Court will
accept a case clarifying how the lower courts should treat remand orders for
the purposes of satisfying Hardt. Although waiting will surely be required,
it may be that courts will determine that a remand order satisfies the
requirements of Hardt without the need for guidance from the Supreme
Court.237
In Hardt, Justice Thomas instructs that a claimant "does not satisfy
[the test] by achieving trivial success on the merits" or a "purely procedural
victor[y]." 238 If, however, "the court can fairly call the outcome of the
litigation some success on the merits without conducting a lengthy inquir[y]
into the question whether a particular party's success was substantial or
occurred on a central issue," the Hardt standard will be satisfied.239
of his own attorney." Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758 (1980) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Outright dismissal is akin to earning no degree of success on the merits and therefore
renders the dismissed party ineligible for a fee award under even the most liberal standard. See,
e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 694 (1983) (announcing the some degree of
success on the merits standard).
235. Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 694.
236. It is significant that the relief be accompanied by the necessary judicial imprimatur,
otherwise the plaintiff falls victim to a scheme called tactical mooting. In a tactical mooting
scheme, the defendant agrees to the relief plaintiff sought in bringing suit, but by conceding, has
mooted the case, leaving no issue suitable for judicial review, and therefore making it impossible
for the plaintiff to win a judgment on the merits. See, e.g., Renee Newman Knake, The Supreme
Court's Increased Attention to the Law of Lawyering: Mere Coincidence or Something More?, 59
AM. U. L. REV. 1499, 1522 (2010) (describing how Reliance argued its case under a tactical
mooting theory so that it could guarantee "no judgment on the merits entitling the plaintiff to
fees").
237. As a practical matter, the Federal Courts of Appeals deal with a multitude of issues
without guidance from above. Taken to a logical extreme, in every matter in which there has been
a denial of certiorari, the federal courts are doing so. Therefore, without guidance from the
Supreme Court, at least intermittently, the lower courts will implement the Hardt standard as they
see fit. See generally Peter Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1227
(1979) (describing how the Supreme Court wields its power to grant or deny certiorari).
238. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 2149, 2158 (2010).
239. Id.
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Substantial temptation exists to lump ERISA cases in with other
familiar standards in the search for clarity. Under Hensley v. Eckerhart,240
for example, plaintiffs are deemed to prevail where they succeed on a
significant issue in the litigation that achieves the benefit the party sought in
bringing suit.241 At first blush, this instruction seems both to follow the
directions of Hardt and to present an instructive standard. Critically,
however, Hensley was decided under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which provides that
a court "in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 242 This
distinction is analogous to the distinction between Buckhannon and
Ruckelshaus discussed above, and therefore compels the same conclusion-
that if the textual differences are to have any meaning, there must also be a
tangible divergence over how the standards are interpreted judicially.243
This situation almost requires the logical impossibility that on one hand
success under Hardt and Hensley roughly equate, but on the other, the
standards cannot mirror one another because Congress has chosen different
statutory language for inclusion in civil rights litigation under Title 42 and
for employee benefits litigation under ERISA.244
The fact that Buckhannon does not apply to the Hardt scenario-
where no prevailing party language is used-allows an additional inference
to be drawn. To "prevail" under Buckhannon, a party must have won an
"enforceable judgment" or secured a "court ordered consent decree." 245
Since Buckhannon cannot apply in the Hardt context, we know that Hardt
must demand a lesser showing than that required under Buckhannon. As a
matter of legal mathematics, therefore, since we know that Hardt compels a
lesser showing than that required by either Buckhannon or Hensley, the
possible scope of remedies that qualify under Hardt is limited. Therefore, as
long as a remand order is judged to entail more than a defeat in an absolute
sense, and less than a judicially enforceable judgment, it should be within
the standards of Hardt.246
240. 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
241. Id. at 433 (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978)).
242. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
243. See supra notes 206-16 and accompanying text.
244. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (employing the "prevailing party" standard), with 29
U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (allowing a fee award to "either party").
245. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S.
598, 604 (2001).
246. This excludes those judgments falling into the "purely procedural" or "trivial" category.
Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 130 S.Ct. 2149, 2158 (2010). As a practical matter,
given the popularity of a remand order as the appropriate remedy, as long as a denial of benefits
isn't supported by substantial evidence, Hardt should be satisfied. See Christopher R. Stevenson,
Abusing Abuse of Discretion: Judicial Review of ERISA Fiduciaries' Discretionary Decisions in
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The overall system for evaluating a remand order is governed by the
fact that before attorney's fees are available, the plaintiff must achieve
"some degree of success on the merits." 247 Hardt teaches that, with facts
sufficient to show that an ERISA fiduciary has shirked its duties, a remand
order qualifies for a fee award.248 In this Note, I have put forward an
argument suggesting that a remand order, without more, may satisfy the
"some degree of success" test. It is unknown if the United States Supreme
Court will further consider how attorney's fees are awarded under Section
I132(g)(1) of ERISA. It is clear, however, that while the Court has added
simplicity to the process (we now know there is no express prevailing party
requirement) the collateral uncertainty generated by the ruling (Does a
remand order qualify under Hardt? How much success on the merits is
enough?) may offset the benefits and affect unforeseen hardship by
discouraging meritorious litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
In Hardt. v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co., the United States
Supreme Court ruled that "some degree of success on the merits" is
necessary to permit a court to award attorney's fees under Section
1132(g)(1) of ERISA. 249 In so holding, the Court properly followed its
precedent dealing with statutory deviations from the American Rule, while
also resolving a disagreement between the federal courts of appeals. 250
While the Court announced a new standard in Hardt, it failed to rule on
whether a remand order sufficiently meets its standard. In so doing, the
Court placed a significant restriction on an important aspect of ERISA
litigation.25 1 Although it is unknown how far the effect of the "some degree
of success standard" will reach, attempts at crafting the outer contours of
the test without direct guidance from the Supreme Court may prove harmful
for ERISA plaintiffs if the new standard increases the difficulty of winning
a fee award. 252
Denial of Benefits Cases, 27 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 105, 116, 130 (2009) (reviewing cases
that evaluate whether an ERISA fiduciary met its requirements under the statute).
247. Hardt, 130 S. Ct. at 2152.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See supra Part IV.A.
251. See supra Part IV.B.I.
252. See supra Part IV.B.11.
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